President Trump announces a sweeping 50% levy on countries arming Tehran, but the Supreme Court ruling has stripped him of his fastest tariff tool, leaving enforcement uncertain as he seeks to maintain relations with Beijing.

US President Donald Trump announced on 8 April 2026, that the US will impose a 50% tariff on all goods imported from any country that supplies military weapons to Iran, despite losing his broadest tariff power earlier this year when the Supreme Court struck down his use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act in February 2026.

The measure takes effect immediately and includes no exceptions or exemptions.

“A Country supplying Military Weapons to Iran will be immediately tariffed, on any and all goods sold to the United States of America, 50%, effective immediately. There will be no exclusions or exemptions!” Trump posted on Truth Social. 

The threat appears primarily aimed at China and Russia, both of whom have allegations of helping Iran develop military capabilities through missiles, air-defence systems, and dual-use technologies. However, both Beijing and Moscow deny recent weapons transfers.

Reuters reported in February 2026 that Tehran was considering purchasing supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles from China. Additionally, in March 2026, China’s leading semiconductor manufacturer SMIC reportedly sent chipmaking tools to Iran’s military, according to senior Trump administration officials.

China connection complicates enforcement

Josh Lipsky, vice president at the Atlantic Council, noted Trump is unlikely to impose new tariffs immediately, as doing so would jeopardise his planned trip to Beijing to meet President Xi Jinping.

On 8 April 2026, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said Trump aims to maintain stability in US-China relations to preserve access to Chinese rare-earth minerals and magnets. Greer emphasised that Trump wants to avoid a “massive confrontation” with Xi.

Limited tariff tools remain

Without IEEPA authority, Trump must rely on slower, more restrictive mechanisms. His most viable option involves Section 301 unfair trade practices tariffs on Chinese goods from his first term, though adding new duties requires a public notice period.

Alternatively, Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act permits sector-specific tariffs for national security purposes, but demands a months-long investigation and public comment process.

Trump’s existing tariffs have already reduced US imports from China from USD 538.5 billion in 2018 to USD 308.4 billion in 2025, with further declines in January and February 2026.

Regarding Russia, US imports dropped sharply after the 2022 Ukraine invasion and subsequent sanctions. However, Russian imports jumped 26.1% to USD 3.8 billion in 2025, with palladium for automotive catalytic converters, fertilisers, and enriched uranium dominating.

The Commerce Department is already pursuing punitive tariffs on Russian palladium following an anti-dumping investigation.